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Madeline Morris*
The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court (ICC) provides for
the establishment of an international court with jurisdiction over genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Treaty provides that, in some
circumstances, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of states
that are not parties to the Treaty and have not otherwise consented to jurisdiction. Specifically, Article 12 provides that, in addition to jurisdiction based on
Security Council action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and
jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant's state of nationality, the ICC
will have jurisdiction to prosecute the nationals of any state when crimes within
the Court's subject matter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state
that is a party to the Treaty or that consents to ICC jurisdiction for that case.
That territorial basis would empower the Court to exercise jurisdiction even in
cases where the defendant's state of nationality is not a party to the Treaty and
does not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.
The United States has objected to the ICC Treaty on the ground that, by
purporting to confer upon the Court jurisdiction over the nationals of nonconsenting non-party states, the Treaty would bind non-parties in contravention
of the law of treaties. This objection has given rise to a heated controversy.
The question of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals poses a genuine
dilemma. There are legitimate and very important concerns on each side of this
matter.
Let me tell you what I think is at stake. On the one hand, there is the
pressing need for justice in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. That need is pressing, if for no other reason, because of the interest
of victims in seeing justice done. There is also the important and related fact
that the sense that justice has been served may help to break cycles of violence
in societies in which revenge and retaliation may otherwise take the place of
trial and punishment. Those reasons are enough to qualify the need for justice
as a pressing need. Perhaps prosecutions also would deter future crimes of
mass violence. That, we do not know. Either way, the need for justice is a
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compelling one, and the ICC may make some important contribution in that
cause.
This brings us to the issue of the ICC's jurisdiction. The crimes of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are often committed with
the collusion of governments. Those governments are unlikely to consent to
ICC jurisdiction over their nationals for crimes that the government supported
or condoned. The Rome Treaty responds to that serious problem by providing
that, in some cases, the Court will have jurisdiction even without the consent
of the defendant's state of nationality and even if that state is not a party to the
Treaty. This sort of jurisdiction makes some sense. It makes sense to give the
Court robust jurisdiction lest a rogue regime should be able to shield its
nationals from justice. And, when viewed from this perspective, it is hard to
see how any state could legitimately object. If the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction is limited to established international crimes and the process of the
Court is fair, then no state - party or non-party - should have legitimate
objections to the Court's exercising jurisdiction over its nationals.
This reasoning might cause us to see ICC jurisdiction over non-party
nationals as relatively unproblematic were it not for the fact that the ICC will
inevitably hear two different types of cases. There will be cases involving
strictly a determination of individual culpability, and cases that will focus on
the lawfulness of the official acts of states. There will, in ICC cases, always be
an individual defendant in the dock. But if the conduct forming the .basis for
the indictment was an official act taken pursuant to state policy and under state
authority, then the case will, in effect, be an adjudication of the lawfulness of
the state's acts and policies. In such cases, the state whose conduct is
questioned might acknowledge the conduct and maintain that the conduct was
lawful; or the state might deny that the alleged acts in fact occurred. In either
event, the case will represent an adjudication of the lawfulness of a state's
conduct and, in that sense, will constitute a legal dispute between states.
For individual culpability cases, the ICC will share much in common with
other criminal courts. For official acts cases, the ICC will resemble much more
an international court for interstate dispute adjudication. For the former, robust
jurisdiction is appropriate for the reasons I have touched on. For the latter,
flexibility and consensuality of jurisdiction are important, as reflected in the
jurisdictional regimes of other international courts that adjudicate interstate
disputes, such as the ICJ, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, and the WTO dispute
settlement system. The ICC, thus, requires ajurisdictional structure that is both
sufficiently aggressive to make the Court effective in the prosecution of
criminals and also sufficiently consensual to make the Court a suitable
institution for the adjudication of international disputes. It is this need for the
ICC's jurisdictional structure to accommodate these two conflicting requirements that creates our dilemma.
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Let me focus for a moment on why compulsory jurisdiction to adjudicate
interstate disputes in an international court may raise serious concerns for
states. Particularly where an interstate dispute concerns an area of unsettled
law, litigation may entail more risk than states can be expected to accept. If the
subject matter is important and the law is unsettled, allowing a third party to,
in effect, decide the binding law of the matter is a very perilous course of
action. Relatedly, compulsory jurisdiction may be problematic insofar as
compromise outcomes of various sorts may be desirable in interstate dispute
type cases, but are unlikely to emerge from adjudicated rather than negotiated
resolutions. It is also important to recognize here that the decisions of an
international court will be more authoritative than would those of any
individual state's courts. Thus, an international court would have the power to
create law in a manner disproportionate to that of any state. This may be more
law-making power than some states are comfortable granting to one international institution - especially in sensitive areas involving military activities and
international security. Moreover, the law developed by an international court
would not be susceptible to revision or reversal through any legislative process,
as would be the case in municipal justice systems. States may have legitimate
concerns about the compulsory jurisdiction of such a court. Finally, states
would need to be more concerned about the political impact of adjudications
before an international court than before an individual state's courts. An evenremotely successful international court will have significant prestige and
authoritativeness. The political repercussions of such a court's determining that
a state's acts or policies were unlawful would be very substantial indeed, and
categorically different from the repercussions of the same verdict emerging
from a national court. States may therefore be put to a choice, in some cases,
of either revealing sensitive data as defense evidence or withholding that
evidence and thereby risking severe political costs in case of a guilty verdict.
These are, in very abbreviated form, the legitimate and significant
concerns that may give states pause in accepting ICC jurisdiction. This is not
to say whether states ultimately should or should not accept ICC jurisdiction.
Rather, the point is that the implications of jurisdiction exercised by an
international court are very different from those of jurisdiction exercised by
national courts. The two kinds of jurisdiction therefore raise very different
concerns for states.
Now, you may say, "It is true that there are these political and policy
considerations at stake for states, but those are not legal bars to jurisdiction."
You may say, "The lawfulness of ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals is
unproblematic, and so states - whatever their policy concerns - are obliged
to accept that jurisdiction." Here is where I believe that an error is made.
ICC jurisdiction over non-party nationals has been justified as a form of
delegated jurisdiction. The theory is that states parties, in effect, delegate their
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universal or territorial jurisdiction to the ICC. However, there are very
significant differences in the consequences and implications of ICCjurisdiction
as distinct from state jurisdiction, in the ways I have just described. For that
reason, it should not be quickly presumed that the option of delegating a state's
jurisdiction to an international court is necessarily part of the customary law of
universal or territorial jurisdiction. Because different state interests are affected
by state jurisdiction and international jurisdiction, consent to or acquiescence
in state-exercised jurisdiction is not equivalent to consent to or acquiescence in
jurisdiction exercised by an international court.
The international law of jurisdiction (universal, territorial, and so on) is
customary law. It has developed through the consent, acquiescence, and
practice of states. Its legitimacy rests precisely on the fact that, in the course
of the law's development, states have accepted a particular jurisdictional
principle as law and have acted accordingly.
Unsurprisingly, states decide whether to accept the development of
particular principles or rules of law based on the implications of those rules for
states' interests, however they define those interests. If the concept of the
"incremental development of customary law" is to mean anything coherent, it
must mean that a development can be considered incremental only if the
development would not fundamentally change the impact of the law on states'
interests. Customary law, if it is to maintain any claim to legitimacy, cannot
proceed by ambush and surprise. We cannot say to states,
This "development" of customary law was unforeseeable and not part
of what was anticipated as the law developed through state practice
and opinio juris. In fact, this "development" has a significantly
different impact on your interests than the rule that it developedfrom.
But, nevertheless, you are now bound to accept this innovation
because it has been deemed incremental.
That would not be legitimate, and it also would not work.
This is why I believe that the concerns that states may have with ICC
jurisdiction are not "mere policy concerns" but are, in fact, of fundamental
legal significance. It cannot be said that the option of delegating states'
jurisdiction to an international court is already an established feature of the
customary law of universal or territorial jurisdiction. And the fact that the
impact of international jurisdiction on state interests is significantly different
from the impact of state-exercised jurisdiction means that we cannot label the
move to include delegability as an "incremental development."
There is no instance of prior state practice involving the delegation of
states' jurisdiction to an international court without the consent of the
defendant's state of nationality. The International Criminal Tribunals for the
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former Yugoslavia and Rwanda base their jurisdiction on Security Council
powers under Chapter VII. The Tokyo Tribunal after WWII based its
jurisdiction on Japan's consent. And the Nuremberg Tribunal based its
jurisdiction on the consent of the Allies, acting as the German sovereign. As
the Nuremberg judgment stated:
[T]he making of the Charter [establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal]
was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries
to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the
undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied
territories has been recognized by the civilized world.
Thus, the Nuremberg Tribunal relied on the right of the Allies to exercise
sovereign prerogatives in Germany as the basis for its jurisdiction. There are
excellent arguments for the view that the Nuremberg Tribunal should not have
done so. But that is what it did. Its jurisdiction may have been flawed for that
reason -but that would mean only that its jurisdiction was flawed, not that the
jurisdiction rested on some basis other than the one stated by the court.
The net result is that none of the four modem international tribunals has
exercised the delegated jurisdiction of states in the absence of consent by the
defendant's state of nationality. Therefore, there appears to be no prior instance
of state practice to support the ICC's exercise of universal or territorial
jurisdiction delegated to it by states without the consent of the defendant's state
of nationality.
Now, you may say, "You're quibbling. If each of the states parties to the
ICC Treaty would have the right to prosecute these defendants, then surely
those states can get together and prosecute them in an international court which
they create." You may say, "Even if there are no prior instances of state
practice of such delegated jurisdiction, the innovation is 'incremental' - states
can prosecute in their national courts or in an international court - it's such a
minor change."
But, here is precisely where we see that, from the point of view of states'
interests, the implications of the innovation are very significant and not minor
or incremental at all. States, for the reasons I have briefly elaborated, may be
unwilling to have their interstate disputes adjudicated by an international court,
even while those same states may accept universal and territorial jurisdiction
and, thus, accept the prosecution of their nationals in the courts of other
individual states.
Thus, when we speak of the delegation of states' jurisdiction to an
international court, we are speaking not of an "incremental development" but
of a substantial and significant legal change. Such substantial changes cannot
and should not be accomplished through labeling them as minor or incremental
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developments in customary international law. An attempt to characterize a
major change as a minor change is bound to meet with resistance, just as we
have seen in the ICC context.
Before closing, I would like briefly to address two different arguments,
sometimes raised in this context, that I think we probably need not detain
ourselves with. I will mention them here in passing, though I say much more
about them in my paper.' The first of these arguments is that the Rome Treaty
has itself created new customary law permitting jurisdiction over non-party
nationals. That claim seems to me to be very premature, for reasons that I take
to be self-evident. If I am wrong about that and there is disagreement on the
point, I would be happy to discuss it.
The other argument sometimes made is that the terrorism treaties
demonstrate that states can create otherwise non-existentjurisdiction in treaties
and then apply that jurisdiction to non-parties. The terrorism treaties do,
indeed, provide that states parties will have, in effect, universal jurisdiction
over the crimes covered in the treaties. But, as I discuss at some length in the
paper,2 this does not indicate that states can create jurisdiction that they would
not have individually by signing a treaty, and then impose that jurisdiction on
non-parties. The better interpretation of the significance of the terrorism
treaties is that those treaties, in effect, propose new customary law. Non-party
states can respond to that proposal by acquiescing in or objecting to the
jurisdiction. If they acquiesce, then the jurisdiction defined in the treaties will,
in time, become customary law. If non-parties object, then the bid to create
new custom will likely fail. So far, in the case of the terrorism treaties, we have
seen acquiescence. That has not been true regarding the jurisdictional
provisions of the ICC Treaty - and therein lies the relevant and crucial
distinction. Once again, I would be happy to discuss the terrorism treaties
further but, in truth, I think that they are off point.
What I think is really relevant here, in conclusion, is that there are
meaningful concerns about the compulsory adjudication of interstate disputes
that might cause a state to reject the jurisdictional regime of the Rome Treaty.
These concerns cannot, I believe, be dismissed as being non-legal in character.
Rather, the fact that the ramifications of international jurisdiction and stateexercised jurisdiction are very different is entirely relevant to and, indeed, calls
sharply into question, the lawfulness of ICC jurisdiction over non-party
nationals.

1.
See Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: Tile ICC and Non-Party States,
forthcoming 63 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS
(2000).
2.
See id.
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For these reasons, I believe that, as I began by saying, what we have is a
genuine dilemma - not excuses or pretexts, but legitimate concerns on each
side. I feel deeply, as we all do, the need for enforcement of the body of law
intended to reduce the human suffering caused by genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. I want for us to make progress on the particular
obstacle to an effective ICC that we are considering today. I believe that we
stand a chance of doing so only if we see realistically the valid concerns on
both sides of this issue and take those concerns seriously into account in
examining whether there may be a workable resolution.

